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Cutting the Gordian Knot:
Taiwan and U.S.-China Relations

By Senator Mike Mansfield

United States relations with China today are on a plateau,
reached more than three years ago with the opening of diplomatic liaison offices in Peking and Washington.

President

Ford has repeatedly stated that the United States is determined
, "to complete the normalization of relations with the People's
Republic of China on the basis of the Shanghai Communique."
However, there has been a policy of avoidance.

With the

principal antagonists in the Chinese civil war now gone, it is
time to wipe the slate clean, to fulfill the promise of the
Shanghai Communique by completing the process.

There is only

one obstacle to normalization, the Taiwan issue,
Taiwan is a point of utmost sensitivity in China's new
national consciousness.

It is the last vestige of China's

humiliation at the hands of outside powers.
on normalization is unwavering.
I

China's position

It expects the United States

to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, terminate the defense
I

II

treaty, and withdraw all military forces from the island.

This

I
I

i

is the Japanese formula as applied to the American situation.

I

II

I

Since

~972,

.when it severed relations with Taiwan and

established diplomatic relations with Peking, Japan's trade

-2with and investments in Taiwan continue at high levels .
Japanese affairs relating to the island are looked after by
a quasi•official office called the Japanese Interchange As sociation.

Taiwan maintains a similar non-diplomatic office in

Tokyo.

Other countries having diplomatic relations with Ch ina

operate in Taiwan under similar arrangements. · so could the
United States.
The answer to the Taiwan problem is not to be found i n
Peking but in Washington.
United States.

It is a domestic problem for t he

The fact that must be faced is that the United

States cannot have it both ways.

We cannot strengthen our t i es

with a claimant government of China on Taiwan and, at the same time,
expect to advance · a new relationship with the government of t he
People's Republic of China.

The Shan&hai Communique was de s igned

as a transitional arrangement; it did not predicate an indefinite
· ambivalence in America's China policy.

Equivocation over the

Taiwan problem has continued fQr too long.

Ambivalence has

created a dangerous situation and further delay could bring
I
'

I

I

II

about serious long-term consequences for American policy i n the
Pacific area.
Stagnation is the enemy of a sound, constructive fore ign
policy, and indecision in policy-making about Taiwan is push i ng
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Americans into choosing sides.

There is a hint of a resurgence

of the divisiveness of a quarter century ago that led to the
current policy dilemma.

The internal problems of China in the

wake of Mao's departure could create conditions in both countries
where the mutual interests now sustaining the relationship will
be weakened.

Delay may well strengthen the harid of the elements

in the Chinese leadership seeking to restore greater comity
with the Soviet Union even at the expense of the U.S. relationship.
The failure to face up to the Taiwan issue will only make the
inevitable decision more ·difficult, controversial, and divisive.
Although it is unrealistic to expect that the Chinese
government will renounce the use of force to regain control of
f
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-4, Taiwan, the Chinese are not likely to rush the process of
absorbing Taiwan into the life of the mainland after the
normalization of relations between China and the United States •
. As the Chinese see the problem, acceptance of the Erinciple
at stake and the practical incorporation of Taiwan into China's
life are two different matters.

The Chinese are impatient

with regard to unequivocal acceptance of the principle, which
stands in the way of complete normalization of relations.
however~

that impatience over principle,

But

is tempered by priorities.

Concern over the Soviet Union comes first at this time.

Inso-

far as Taiwan is concerned, timing does not· appear to be a pressing
problem.

While the process of absorption is regarded as in-·

evitable it is likely to take many years.
I believe that satisfactory arrangements can be worked out
concerning the handling of America's residual relations with Taiwan,
as has been the case with Japan and other countries.

Moreover,

the Chinese know full well that any unprovoked military action
in the Western Pacific would be a seriously unsettling event in
Asia which could set off grave repercussions in the United St ates
and Japan, to say the least.

It would undermine a basic element

in present Chinese foreign policy toward the Soviet Union.

The

peaceful merging of Taiwan with the mainland, therefore, must
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be an implicit element in working out diplomatic arrangements
between the People's Republic and the United States.
Congressional action may be necessary to arrange for continuation of trade and related ties to Taiwan to accord with
a U.S. version of the "Japanese formula".

In the spirit of

bi-partisanship which has marked support of U.S. China policy
since the Shanghai Communique, Congress should be prepared to
·' ·
''

take such action, as the Senate did in 1971 in approving a
resolution giving " •••• full support to the President (Nixon)
in seeking the normalization of relations with the People's
Republic of China."
It is important that a dialogue begin without delay between
the People's Republic and Taiwan.

Th~

Shanghai Communique states

that America's goal is "a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan
question by the Chinese themselves."

Leaders of the People's

Republic of China have repeatedly expressed their willingness to
engage in peaceful relations with Taiwan and have made gestures
to underscore the point.
For more than two decades the United States closed its
official mind to China and the channels of effective communi-

.I

cation between the two nations were blocked.

j,

of this period of know-nothingism still linger.

I
I

I
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The consequences
Miscalculations

-6about China may well have been the main factor in the involve-

I

I
~

I

ment of the United States in two major wars in Asia in a single
generation.

Pressures are at work which could cause another

major miscalculation over Taiwan.
America's national interest is deeply involved in moving
without further delay to settle the Taiwan problem.

Further

delay could well prove to be another in the long series of
disastrous miscalculations which have afflicted U.S. foreign
policy in Asia since World War II.

Solving this problem will

put the United States in a unique position in the triangular
relationship.

If it acts more wisely than in the past, the

United States will act now, not on the basis of emotional catchphrases, but on the basis of its long-range interests in the
Western Pacific.
interests

Fundamental to the safeguarding of these

is an open diplomatic door between the government

of what will soon be a billion Chinese and the government of
the people of the United States.
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